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Abstract
This article provides the first comprehensive analysis of the Finns Party’s (Perussuomalaiset [PS]) formal organisation and
how it operates in practice. Following the framework of this thematic issue, to what extent does the PS’s organisation
follow themass‐party model and how centralised is the party in its internal decision‐making? Analysis of party documents,
association registries, and in‐depth interviews with 24 party elite representatives reveal that the PS has developed a com‐
plex organisational structure and internal democracy since 2008. However, the power of members in regard to the party’s
internal decision‐making remains limited, despite the party’s leadership having facilitated a more horizontal and inclu‐
sionary organisational culture after 2017. The study reveals how the party combines radically democratic elements of its
leadership selection and programme development with a very high level of centralisation of formal power in the party
executive, and how the party organisationally relies on a vast and autonomous but heterogeneous network of municipal
associations. The article also discusses how PS elites perceive the advantages of having a wide and active organisation
characterised by low entry and participation requirements, and how party‐adjacent online activism both complements
and complicates the functioning of the formal party organisation.
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1. Introduction
Various scholars have argued that European mainstream
political parties have lost their connection with their
grassroots and ceased to engage in actively foster‐
ing party activism (Katz & Mair, 1995; Mair, 2013).
As mainstream parties have become less reliant on mass‐
membership organisations as a means to reach out
to the public and to foster collective identities (Mair,
1989, pp. 176–179), they are witnessing falling mem‐
bership numbers (van Biezen et al., 2012). As part of
becoming so‐called “cartel parties,” mainstream parties’
internal representative organs and “the party on the
ground” have ostensibly diminished in their political rel‐
evance (Katz, 2002; Katz & Mair, 1995). Simultaneously,
right‐wing populist parties (RWPPs) have actively started
to challenge mainstream political parties’ claim to
power (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015; van Kessel, 2015).
In terms of their organisation, RWPPs have often been
regarded as relying on centralised and charismatic lead‐
ershipwhilst remaining organisationally underdeveloped
(Betz, 1998; Taggart, 2000). However, more recent empir‐
ical evidence suggests that several European RWPPs have
developed enduring and complex mass‐membership
organisations throughwhich they aim to foster loyal com‐
munities of activists—in other words, they have been
argued to have adopted characteristics of themass‐party
model (Albertazzi, 2016; Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2016).
These findings challenge the view that all right‐wing pop‐
ulist mobilisations are fickle, highly personalised, and
organisationally lean.
The task undertaken by this thematic issue is to
analyse to what extent European RWPPs have invested
in building organisations that rely heavily on the
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involvement of activists on the ground, and to what
extent the parties also grant members the opportunity
to exercise meaningful influence over the party’s inter‐
nal decision‐making. Utilising the analytical framework
proposed by Albertazzi and van Kessel (2021), this arti‐
cle focuses on the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset [PS]).
Whereas the organisation of RWPPs in otherNordic coun‐
tries has been studied (e.g., Jungar, 2016; Jupskås, 2016),
little research has been done on the PS’s current organ‐
isational structure or the party organisation’s relation‐
ship with its members. Arter (2012, 2016) researched
the early years of the PS, focusing especially on party‐
building as a project led by the long‐term party leader,
Timo Soini. Arter and Kestilä‐Kekkonen (2014) described
elements of the party’s organisation in the early 2010s as
part of their evaluation of the degree of the PS’s electoral,
internal, and legislative institutionalisation. Koiranen
et al. (2017) conducted a survey with PS members pro‐
viding analysis of the members’ sociodemographic back‐
ground and networks. Therefore, no previous study has
made the PS’s organisation and intra‐party power rela‐
tions the primary target of research.
This article provides the first comprehensive descrip‐
tion and analysis of how the PS is formally structured and
how informal organisational practices affect the function‐
ing and centralisation of power within the party organ‐
isation. Via the analysis of party documents, associa‐
tion registries, and research interviews conducted with
24 members of the party’s elite (see appendices 1 and 2
in the Supplementary File), this study addresses two
core research questions. First, to what extent, how, and
with what kind of success has the PS built a well‐rooted
party on the ground, sustained a significant base ofmem‐
bers and activists, and attempted to preserve and to fur‐
ther ideological coherence within the party via its formal
organisation? Second, how do the PS’s organisational
form and informal organisational practices affect the
degree of centralisation in terms of the party’s decision‐
making and internal democracy?
Methodologically, the study relies on qualitative anal‐
ysis of a large number of semi‐structured thematic party
elite interviews. The interviews were conducted to gain
insight into the PS’s internal politics and communication
structures, party elites’ narratives regarding themethods
and reasons for investing in and socialising activists on
the ground, and informal practices thatmight advance or
hinder the power of ordinary members. The interviews
were also used to interrogate to what extent the party’s
formal structure and power relations institutionalised in
the party’s rules hold true in practice, requiring sepa‐
rate analysis of party documents (PS, 2009, 2013, 2021).
All of the interviewed individuals have or had held one or
several leading positions at different levels of the party
organisation. The interviewees included twomembers of
the party leadership, three current or former party secre‐
taries, fourmembers of the parliamentary group, amem‐
ber of the party office staff, a member of the party execu‐
tive, and seven regional leaders and six local leaders from
Central Finland and Southwest Finland. To complement
the analysis of the research interviews and party doc‐
uments, a quantitative description of the development
of the party’s member base and its network of associa‐
tions was produced using data gathered from the archive
of the Finnish Patent and Registry Office (Finnish Patent
and Registry Office, 2021) and secondary sources (see
appendix 4 in the Supplementary File).
1.1. Short History of the Finns Party
The PS (commonly known internationally as the True
Finns until 2011) was founded in October 1995 by politi‐
cians and activists from the Finnish Rural Party (Suomen
Maaseudun Puolue [SMP]). The first decade of the PS
was ideologically marked by the SMP’s centre‐leftist
anti‐establishment populism that targeted the “corrupt
old parties” on behalf of the “forgotten people” of
the Finnish periphery (Arter, 2012). As party leader,
Timo Soini (1997–2017) built on the SMP’s heritage
to combine centre‐leftist economic policies with social‐
conservative values, and a nostalgic patriotic longing for
a Finnish heartland where one prioritises “home, reli‐
gion, and the fatherland” (Vares, 2011, p. 33). In its first
parliamentary elections in 1999, the PS proclaimed to
be “the right‐wing party of the poor,” but ever since,
the party leadership has downplayed ideological connec‐
tions to both the left and right (Arter, 2016). Under the
leadership of Jussi Halla‐aho, the party has programmat‐
ically shifted economically to the right, heavily fortified
its nativism and toned down its Christian and centre‐left
heritage, and can now be classified as a populist radical
right party (Hatakka, 2021).
The PS’s rise to power was long and arduous, but in
the 2011 elections the party won 39 seats in the Finnish
parliament. In 2015, the party lost only one seat and
joined a coalition government for two years. Despite the
party having appeared stable in its internal composition
during the first electoral cycle after becoming a major
party (Arter & Kestilä‐Kekkonen, 2014), internal faction‐
alism revolved around the personas of Timo Soini and
Jussi Halla‐aho. This eventually led to the split of the par‐
liamentary group in 2017 after Halla‐aho was elected as
party leader (e.g., Nurmi, 2017). Despite initially losing
half of its polled support after taking part in government,
the party matched its representation in the 2019 parlia‐
mentary elections as the second‐largest party in Finland.
After that, the party’s support has continued to grow.
Thus, in terms of electoral institutionalisation, the PS has
not only been able to create a stable position for itself
in the Finnish party system (Arter & Kestilä‐Kekkonen,
2014) but has also managed to strengthen its support
and consolidate its ideological direction after a severe
internal crisis. Following victoriousmunicipal elections in
2021, the party’s recently institutionalised populist radi‐
cal right alignment was continued as the party’s mem‐
bers elected Riikka Purra as Jussi Halla‐aho’s successor
at the party’s helm. An explanation for the party’s quick
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recovery and apparent stability in the face of internal tur‐
moil and leadership change can be found in the party’s
rootedness on the ground.
2. The Finns Party on the Ground
To evaluate the extent to which the PS has adopted the
mass‐party model, in the next sections I will analyse the
party’s organisational extensiveness, practices ofmember
recruitment and socialisation, the role of social media for
party activism, and perceived advantages and disadvan‐
tages of maintaining a mass‐membership organisation.
The PS is an officially registered party (Perussuoma‐
laiset rp). The official organs of the registered party
at the national level are: (1) party congress (puolueko‐
kous), (2) party executive (puoluehallitus), (3) party coun‐
cil (puoluevaltuusto), (4) advisory assembly (puolueneu‐
vosto), and (5) parliamentary group (eduskuntaryhmä).
They facilitate intra‐party decision‐making and create
and implement the party’s programmes at the national
level. However, to describe the party’s organisational
form, one cannot just focus on the registered party
and its organisational bodies; the key role played by
numerous party associations also needs to be recog‐
nised. The only official member associations of the PS
are the 16 regional associations that each hosts between
four and 28 municipal associations. In January 2021, the
PS’s regional associations hosted a total of 242municipal
associations. Additionally, there were 23 special interest
associations that (like themunicipal associations) are not
officially member associations of the party. Lastly, there
were two support associations: the Suomen Perusta
think tank and the Pekasus centre for intra‐party training.
Therefore, in early 2021, the PS’s organisation consisted
of 284 officially recognised associations with their own
rules and organisational bodies (Table 1).











TOTAL: 284 organisational entities
The PS’s organisation has significantly widened since the
late 2000s in termsof the numbers ofmembers andparty
associations and their territorial coverage. This has hap‐
penedmainly via the founding of newmunicipal and spe‐
cial interest associations and the reactivation of defunct
regional and local SMP associations. Figure 1 presents
a timeline of when PS associations were founded and
how large a share of associations that at some point
have been part of the party still remain party associa‐
tions in the early 2020s. The timeline reveals three core
findings: (1) The core of the PS’s network of municipal
associations was inherited from the SMP; (2) the current
organisational width of the party organisation was estab‐
lished between 2008 and 2013; and (3) even though
the party organisation’s territorial expansion has nearly
ceased during the current leadership, the party’s mem‐
bership numbers remain on the rise.
During 1995–2007, the PS relied organisationally
mostly on the extant network of the SMP’s local asso‐
ciations. After the SMP’s demise, 117 SMP associa‐
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S ll part of the party organisa on in 2021, N = 284
Number of Members
Figure 1. Number of SMP and PS associations founded annually and number of party members 1959–2020 (regarding the
sources and method of data collection, see appendices 3 and 4 in the Supplementary File).
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temporarily, and nearly half of the current PS associa‐
tions date back to the SMP era. In 2008, the PS started
a coordinated horizontal expansion (Representative 5)
that peaked in 2012, supported by the party securing
approximately €6M of annual state funding by obtaining
39 seats in parliament in 2011. In the years 2008–2013
the PS expanded more than the SMP had ever done,
founding 148 new associations. This expansion increased
the PS’s organisational presence to a respectable 82% of
Finnish municipalities by the elections of 2017. In the
2021 municipal elections, the party had candidates in
98% of the municipalities and got representation on 284
municipal councils, thus lacking a council seat in only
nine municipalities.
The number of PS members remained very low until
the beginning of the party’s expansion in 2008. Whereas
the SMP had a membership of 20,000–27,000 in the
1970s and 1980s, the PS had only a couple of thou‐
sand members in 2004, nine years after the party was
founded. Overall, it took 13 years for the party’s mem‐
bership numbers to start to increase, but there has
been an upward trend ever since. Despite the number
of PS members having almost tripled in a decade since
early 2011, the number of members remains relatively
low when compared to the three other large parties in
Finland. However, when evaluating the scale of member‐
ship, onemust take into account that political partymem‐
bership is relative rare and has been in decline in Finland
since 1980 (Borg et al., 2013, p. 28; Mickelsson, 2021).
Thus, the PS—together with the Green League and
the Left Alliance—remains an exception as its member‐
ship numbers have almost consistently risen throughout
the 2010s, whereas the traditional parties’ membership
numbers have decreased (Borg et al., 2016; Mickelsson,
2021). After the splitting of the parliamentary group in
2017, the party initially lost approximately 400members,
but due to renewed interest in party membership, the
party soon recovered and exceeded its previous mem‐
bership numbers. According to current party elites, the
split of the parliamentary group did not affect the func‐
tioning of the party organisation detrimentally, except
for individual associations that suffered from defections
by prominent local leaders (Representatives 4, 8, 12, and
16). Therefore, the party has built an extensive and ter‐
ritorially comprehensive network of local associations
with growing membership, and the party’s degree of
organisation is high.
2.1. Member Recruitment, Mobilisation, and
Socialisation
Despite membership in the PS having risen since the
late 2000s and party elites increasingly viewing mem‐
bers as vital assets for the party, there has been no clear
centralised strategic investment in member recruitment
from the party’s national level (Representatives 3 and 4).
The obtaining of new members and the activation of the
member base takes place in the municipal associations
that are the party’s primary organisational presence on
the ground. Recruitment activity between associations
ranges from passive to very active. All local associations
organise so‐called “tent events,” where local activists set
up a stand usually at a marketplace to offer passers‐
by coffee and a chance to chat with local and tour‐
ing national party representatives. According to all inter‐
viewed party elites, such events are the most important
source for new members in addition to recruitment via
personal contacts. Another universally common route
for entry into the party barely involves the formal party
organisation, as nearly half of the new members apply
formembership on their own initiative, without any prior
contact with local party associations or party members
(Representatives 1 and 2). Therefore, the motivation for
joining the party can arise irrespective of the mobilisa‐
tion efforts by the formal party organisation.
The national level of the party communicates directly
with the party members via the party’s paper, online
newswebsite, YouTube channel, Facebook page, and reg‐
ular e‐letters from the party office and the parliamen‐
tary group. Direct instructions, strategic considerations,
and educational materials are disseminated to members
mostly via the regional and local associations by using
the local leadership as messengers. The municipal asso‐
ciations keep in touch with local members via mass‐
emails, phone calls, WhatsApp groups, Facebook pages,
and varyingly frequent face‐to‐face meetings. However,
themunicipal associations’ communication practices are
heterogeneous.While in themost active associations the
leadership and core activists try to establish a constant
connection even with passive party members, in some
associations local members barely keep in touch with
each other beyond formal routine meetings. According
to the interviews, the level of commitment and sense
of community among members vary according to the
local organisational cultures and styles of leadership.
The most active associations organise social events,
such as Christmas parties, bowling, and sauna nights,
which are described as serving the organisational goal of
social bonding between activists. Active municipal and
regional associations also organise lectures, seminars,
and city hall meetings, most of which are also open to
non‐members (e.g., Representatives 17 and 20).
The only official requirements for membership in the
PS are that members must be 18 years of age and “of
good reputation,” and they cannot be a member in any
other political party (PS, 2009, 2021). Party membership
is granted by the party executive, not by local chapters
like in most other Finnish parties. Therefore, PS mem‐
bers must separately apply for membership in a local
association, but it is not mandatory. According to party
elites, an adequate quality of members is ensured via
requiring applicants to have local recommenders, or if
they have none, the applicant’s closest local association
is contacted via email to query whether the local lead‐
ership has anything against an applicant’s membership
(Representative 24). Before the meeting of the party
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executive, unknown applicants may also be googled to
screen for activities that could prove harmful for the
party. In this context, the interviewees specifically men‐
tion the monitoring of overt links to the extreme right.
But as the party executive may have to process dozens,
sometimes even hundreds, of applications during one
meeting, “unwanted people” are unavoidably granted
memberships (Representatives 4 and 24). The proce‐
dures for ensuring quality of members at the local level
vary from non‐existent to structured interviewing, but
in all cases, membership in a municipal association
is granted by the municipal board (Representative 22;
PS, 2013).
There are fewmaterial benefits provided bymember‐
ship in the PS. Members get a subscription to the party’s
magazine, Perussuomalainen, and access to the party’s
online portal, Suomen Uutiset. The only other tangible
benefits are the food and refreshments served at events
and meetings. The advantage of getting employment is
not an important reason for activism at the local and
regional levels, as the relatively few jobs within the party
organisation are fully centralised in the party office or in
the parliamentary office. However, especially for young
people, the prospect of advancing in the party’s ranks to
become, for example, a municipal councillor or an aide
to a Member of Parliament can incentivise activism (e.g.,
Representative 1). The party also provides its activists
with training on, for example, municipal administration,
association procedures, and social media communica‐
tions. Intra‐party training is organised either directly by
local and regional associations, often carried out by the
most experienced local party activists and politicians,
or it may be provided by the party’s national Pekasus
training centre (Representatives 1 and 3). There are also
financial and social reasons for individuals to not join
the party, as according to most of the interviewed party
elites, potential members may be discouraged by the
prospect of harming their career or business or becom‐
ing socially stigmatised. The insignificant material advan‐
tages of PS membership are confirmed by a survey study,
according to which, of all party members in Finland, PS
members were least likely to answer that they benefited
financially or professionally from their partymembership
(Koiranen et al., 2017, p. 75).
According to party elites, activism in the PS is moti‐
vated especially by the prospect of making a difference
and the personal and social gratification provided by
being part of amovement. Themost prominent narrative
is that the key reason for joining and staying in the party
is to have a platform to advance the issues on andbeyond
the party’s political agenda both locally and nationally.
Activists are also said to be significantly motivated by
social interaction, a sense of group membership, and a
sense of worth and recognition. According to the inter‐
views, for many activists the social circles found in local
party branches and at party congresses are important for
acquiring like‐minded close friends and acquaintances,
which intensifies the activists’ commitment. The most
committed activists for whom “the party is everything”
(Representative 18) voluntarily spend several hours per
day on party business. According to party elite narratives,
the high level of motivation among activists is the result
of the party’s attempts to foster a sense of community
among its members. However, as the local associations
are heterogeneous in their levels of activity, so too do the
commitment, motivation, and sense of belonging among
activists vary significantly between associations.
According to the party elites, there is a clear organ‐
ised attempt from the party to ideologically inform and
to educate the members participating in the munici‐
pal associations. But many of the party’s members, let
alone supporters, have a very thin or non‐existent con‐
nection to the party organisation itself. According to
the interviews, furthermore, there is often little interest
towards the party’s communications, even among mem‐
bers. Even though most of the party’s formal activism
takes place in local associations, almost half of the party
members are not members of a municipal association
(Representatives 4 and 24). This means that a large share
of the party’s official members are out of the loop of
most of the party’s communications to members, face‐
to‐face socialisation, and the formal practices that facil‐
itate the party’s internal democracy between party con‐
gresses. Additionally, according to party elites’ estimates,
only a third of the members with membership of a
local party association regularly participate in any for‐
mal party activities (Representative 8). However, activists
who physically volunteer in the party’s events and asso‐
ciations predominantly have membership both of the
party and a municipal association.
2.2. Internet and Social Media in Party Organisation
and Activism
As many PS members and sympathisers identify with
the party via mainstream or online media, the politi‐
cal activism relevant for the party’s performance partly
takes place outside of the participatory framework
provided by the party’s formal organisation. Social
media especially provide alternative platforms for party‐
adjacent networking and advocacy, particularly for party
members and supporters who are not involved in any
of the party associations and for members of inac‐
tive, poorly organised, or infighting local associations
(Representatives 1 and 3). According to interviewed
party elites, members are especially active on Facebook,
discussion forums, news platforms’ comment sections,
and blog platforms. However, more recently YouTube
and Twitter, in particular, have become key platforms for
both national and local party politicians and activists to
voice their opinions. In addition to being viewed as organ‐
isational tools that aid activists in their work in party
associations, party elites stress the importance of social
media as means for activists to promote and to inform
the party about political topics they are personally pas‐
sionate about (Representatives 8, 10, 16, and 19).
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Thus, in addition to its formal network of associa‐
tions, the party benefits from an online grassroots base
comprising networks of members and sympathisers who
participate on social media to advance what they per‐
ceive as the party’s cause. Based on the conducted inter‐
views, however, the formal party organisation has little
control, institutionalised strategy, or even understand‐
ing of what its online grassroots and local politicians
are doing on the internet, as party elites do not view
online communications as “official” party communica‐
tions (e.g., Representatives 3 and 8). Still, most party
elites view social media and party supporters’ online
actions as essential for the dissemination and sharpen‐
ing of the party’s message.Whilst, in general, party elites
do not regard the organisation’s general online strategy
particularly developed when compared to other parlia‐
mentary parties (Representatives 6 and 8), the party has
repeatedly ranked high in metrics that measure online
engagement and following (e.g., Tervo, 2021). Previous
researchhas shown that the party’s ability to tap into con‐
troversial ideational and stylistic resources, while retain‐
ing an appearance of normalcy, has been facilitated by
the overlapping of two spheres of activism: one of insti‐
tutionalised party activism carried out within the for‐
mal party organisation and one of party‐adjacent online
activism (see Hatakka, 2019; Ylä‐Anttila, 2020). This is
likely to have fed into the prevailing organisational prac‐
tice according towhich the PS tries to avoid publicly inter‐
vening in members’ online conduct and mostly leaves
the style and contents of online communications to
the members’ own discretion. However, in cases where
party secrets have been disclosed or the party’s public
image has been blatantly or intentionally jeopardised
online, both informal and formal disciplinary measures
have been conducted at the local and national levels
(Representatives 3, 12, 16, and 23).
2.3. Perceived Advantages and Disadvantages of
Fostering an Active Base of Finns Party Activists
According to party elites, the municipal associations are
essential to the PS for conducting on‐the‐ground cam‐
paigning, for establishing and maintaining a presence
in local governance, for increasing the party’s legiti‐
macy locally and regionally, and for recruiting candidates
and party officials. Party members are insignificant for
the party as a source of income both nationally and
locally (National Audit Office, 2020), and due to the gen‐
erosity of state funding, the party would be financially
viable even with free membership. Taking into consid‐
eration that the party organisation consists of 284 offi‐
cially recognised organisational entities but has only
23 members of staff, the party organisation relies almost
entirely on volunteering. Thus, the party organisation’s
level of professionalisation is very low. Not surprisingly,
according to the party elites, the party would not be
able to function without activists, especially in munici‐
pal elections.
Due to its reliance on volunteers, the PS intention‐
ally keeps the threshold for participating as low as pos‐
sible. The party does not require long‐term membership
or prior participation in the party organisation before
members can run as candidates or serve in a position
of responsibility within the organisation. As individu‐
als can advance very quickly in the party’s ranks, this
can also cause problems for the party’s cohesion and
functioning. According to several interviewees, munici‐
pal associations are often plagued with conflicts that can
arise especially due to the inexperience, incompetence,
and mismatched chemistries of local activists. According
to local leaders, a single individual may be enough to
create a toxic environment in an association, which
has led not only to infighting but also to the expelling
of members and entire local and regional associa‐
tions (Representatives 4, 20, and 22). Many interviewed
party elites consider the increasing lack of communica‐
tion control as detrimental to the party’s functioning.
The problemwas especially prominent during the party’s
organisational expansion in the years 2008–2013, when
thousands of people with little knowledge and experi‐
ence joined in as party activists in newly founded associa‐
tions. According to a senior Member of Parliament, “dur‐
ing that time anybody could get a position on some exec‐
utive board” (Representative 1). As after 2017 a good
number of the party’s most experienced activists have
been replaced by newcomers, and the party’s member‐
ship numbers keep increasing, the party has tried to pro‐
videmore training and direct guidance to its associations
and members (Representative 4).
3. Centralisation vs. Horizontality in the Finns Party
The PS having achieved a high degree of organisation and
complex procedures for facilitating intra‐party democ‐
racy does not mean that it empowers its members
and party on the ground in terms of internal decision‐
making. The next sections analyse the formal and infor‐
mal distribution of power within the PS. Figure 2 illus‐
trates the relationships between the PS’s institutions:
who elects whom and thus to whom the elected bod‐
ies are accountable, who grants membership or expels
whom, and where each organisational body of the
party has representation. There are three levels in the
party: the national, the regional, and the municipal level.
The national level consists of the different institutional
bodies of the registered party: the party congress, party
executive board, party council, parliamentary group, and
advisory assembly. The national level is linked to the
regional levels via institutionalised representation of
regional executives on the party council. In turn, the
regional level is attached to the municipal level either
via municipal executives or assemblies. All other party
organs, including municipal council groups, special inter‐
est associations, the group of Members of the European
Parliament, and the additional support organisations,
have little or no institutionalised power in the party.
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Figure 2. The PS’s organisational chart (August 2021).
Unlike most other Finnish parties, in which inter‐
nal democracy functions via a system of regional dele‐
gates, the PS’s internal democracy is organised in a dual‐
pronged manner, with two formal routes for party mem‐
bers to influence the national level of the party. The
first route goes through party congress, in which party
members directly elect the party leadership (in a bien‐
nial two‐stage direct election) and accept changes to the
party’s rules (PS, 2009, 2021). The second route for influ‐
encing the national level goes via the municipal associ‐
ations, which elect regional representatives, who then
can become members of the regional boards, of the
party council, and even of the party executive. So, on
the face of it, the PS appears to give a considerable
amount of power to its members. However, when analy‐
sed closely, both the party’s formal structure and several
informally institutionalised practices severely curtail the
members’ influence.
The party executive has the power to affect nearly
everything that goes on in the party. It wields power
over the party’s programmes, approval of national‐level
election candidates, budget allocation, and hiring of staff.
Most importantly, the party executive controls all individ‐
ual and institutional party memberships and possesses
both formal and informal leverage on the lower party
levels. Even though the party executive is accountable to
the annual meeting of the party council, this accountabil‐
ity is diminished by two factors. First, the party council
has more of a symbolic than an actual role in the party’s
strategic and programmatic decisions and day‐to‐day
operations. Second, despite the party council being pow‐
erful in terms of electing most of the party executive,
it has few other significant powers, and its representa‐
tional legitimacy is limited by how it is elected.
Even though previous statute dictated that the party
congress was supposed to elect the non‐institutionally
assigned seats of the council (PS, 2009), this has not
happened in practice due to an originally informal but
recently institutionalised organisational norm. In real‐
ity, party council seats have been negotiated in advance
between regional boards and rubber‐stamped by the
party congress (Representatives 3 and 4). This long‐
standing informal practice that was formalised in the
party’s new rules in 2021 (PS, 2021) makes the party
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executive resilient against takeovers via the party
congress. Additionally, as representation on the party
council, which elects the majority of the members of the
party executive, is ensured via membership at the local
level, the fact that relatively few party members have
localmembership undermines the legitimacy of the over‐
sight of the party’s executive organ. Also, despite there
being 16 regional associations, there are only seven seats
for regional representatives in the party executive,mean‐
ing less than half of the regional associations have repre‐
sentation. Even though several of the interviewed party
elites were concerned about the overt contention this
creates in the regions (e.g., Representatives 4, 5, and 20),
the party’s rule change of 2021 did not include expansion
of the party executive to strengthen regional representa‐
tion (PS, 2021).
Although the PS’s municipal associations oper‐
ate autonomously in their day‐to‐day activities, their
statutes state specifically that the associations “must
follow the party’s and the party organs’ decisions and
instructions” (PS, 2013). The conducted interviews sug‐
gest that, in practice, local party officials tend to adhere
closely to the decisions and instructions provided by
the party office, the party leadership, and the regional
boards (e.g., Representatives 4, 22, and 24). Due to the
party executive’s capacity to exert centralised control
over problematic associations, it is theoretically possible
for the party board to supress factionalism that might
arise locally or regionally. However, party elites describe
attempts of controlling the lower levels purely as pro‐
viding “guidance” and “assistance,” and local leaders
specifically state that the national level very rarely inter‐
venes in the actions of the local associations. Therefore,
as long as the local and regional associations do not
cause harm to other party associations or to the party,
they are usually able to—and are even expected to—act
autonomously. The party executive or the party office
intervenes in the local or regional levels only in highly
unusual circumstances, as local infighting is handled by
prioritising informal means and by following the princi‐
ple of subsidiarity, meaning local problems should be
solved locally. And generally, there is little need for for‐
mal interventions, as the party’s network of municipal
associations is, according to party elites, ideologically
rather uniform (Representatives 1, 2, 12, and 16).
3.1. Formal and Informal Member Power in the
Finns Party
The PS’s current organisational form centralises power
in the party executive to the extent that most of the
key internal decisions can theoretically be made by a
small circle of just seven people. However, the inter‐
viewed party elites observe that the party’s organisa‐
tional culture has taken a turn towards decentralisation.
Even though the party’s current formal structure has
not significantly changed since 2009, the interviewed
party elites stress that, during Jussi Halla‐aho’s leader‐
ship, the party developedmore of an open and approach‐
able organisational culture, in which activists were wel‐
come to express their concerns and to act on their own
ideas regarding the improving of the party’s organisa‐
tion and activities. In addition to the municipal associa‐
tions having allegedly more room to manoeuvre, mem‐
bers’ views regarding the party and its functioning are
claimed to be listened to by national leadership and
the party office, and the party has also developed
institutionalised procedures for consulting its member
base in developing the party’s programmes and rules
(Representatives 6, 12, and 17). However, the extent
to which local organisational cultures facilitate horizon‐
tal participation depends heavily on the leadership style
of local leaders (Representatives 4 and 5). Furthermore,
considering that the party executive, after years of intra‐
party discussion, proposed only minute changes to the
party’s rules in 2021 (PS, 2021), centralisation of formal
power persists in the PS regardless of any increase in
informal member power.
In terms of national leadership selection, the PS
members have a lot of power. The party leader, the
three vice party leaders, and the party secretary are
selected in a direct election in party congress where
all attending party members have one vote (PS, 2009,
2021). The power of members in candidate selection
depends on the type of elections, and there are dif‐
ferences between the regional and municipal associa‐
tions. In the municipal elections, the local associations
draft candidate lists autonomously, but different associ‐
ations use different means of drafting and approving the
lists. In parliamentary elections, where candidacies are in
shorter supply, the candidate selection processes tend
to be more systematic, partially due to Finnish election
legislation. But still, there are notable differences in how
the lists are drafted between the regional associations.
For example, in the Southwest Finland regional associ‐
ation, some of the names on the list are picked by the
regional board based purely on electoral‐strategic con‐
siderations, but a share of the candidacies is selected
via a member vote organised by the region’s municipal
associations. However, in the end, the party executive
may change one fourth of the names on the lists sug‐
gested by the regional associations (PS, 2009, 2021)—
but this power is used sparingly (Representatives 12, 13,
and 16). In European Parliament elections, according to
the party’s 2009 rules, the candidates were supposed to
be selected via a member vote, but in practice, the can‐
didates have been directly selected by the party execu‐
tive. This informal practice was institutionalised into the
party’s official rules in 2021 (PS, 2021).
For most Finnish parties, the party congress is the
institution in which programmatic policy positions are
drafted, revised, and ratified. In the PS, it is up to work‐
ing groups led formally by the party executive to devise
programmatic drafts, which are then discussed by the
advisory assembly, who make suggestions for revisions.
Besides revising and (originally) formally ratifying the
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party’s programmatic outputs (PS, 2009), the advisory
assembly also serves as an intra‐party socialising and net‐
working event (Representatives 3 and 22). Some of the
interviewed party elites consider the advisory assembly
essential to getting suggestions for revising the party pro‐
grammes (Representatives 2, 9 and 22), but several inter‐
viewees were also sceptical of whether the suggested
revisions end up in the final programmes. The sheer logis‐
tics of getting feedback and suggestions for revisions
from a crowd of hundreds of people during a one‐day
event reduces the advisory assembly’s role as a func‐
tional means to ensure horizontal and inclusive formu‐
lation of party programmes (Representatives 4 and 8).
Overall, the drafting of the party’s national pro‐
grammes is not transparent, as the working groups oper‐
ate behind closed doors and include only one or a
few high‐ranking party politicians, aides, or party office
staff (Representatives 2 and 9). However, the process
is not entirely centralised, as the working groups use
crowdsourcing as a means of accumulating contents
for the programme drafts via the local associations
(Representatives 17 and 20). In addition to gathering
programmatic feedback from the members, proactive
expert activists, in particular, are sometimes able to
influence the drafting of the programmes. This occurs
when they take the initiative to gain access to the work‐
ing groups or when they are asked directly to con‐
tribute (Representatives 9 and 12). After the meeting of
the advisory assembly, the working group or the head
writer produces the revised final programme, which has
thus far invariably been accepted by the party execu‐
tive. Thus, despite the party going to lengths to facili‐
tate the hearing of its members in the formulation of
party policies, the final form of the programmes is ulti‐
mately determined by the party’s top elite. As party
elites view this kind of centralisation as a direct safe‐
guard against the potential radicalisation of party plat‐
forms (e.g., Representative 4), it was not surprising that
in the party’s new rules the power tomakeprogrammatic
decisions was reserved ultimately for the party execu‐
tive (PS, 2021). Though the rule change further dimin‐
ishes formal member power in the PS, it has to be noted
that the powers of the advisory assembly were already
restricted by several informal practices and the general
format of the assembly.
4. Conclusions: The Finns Party as an Unknowingly
Modern Mass‐Party
The PS has a complex and extensive organisational
structure and procedures facilitating internal democracy.
However, the extent to which it allows its activists to
affect the party’s internal decision‐making in practice
remains formally limited. The party developed a compre‐
hensive network of (mostly) autonomousmunicipal asso‐
ciations during the late 2000s and early 2010s, but in
some regions, and especially smaller rural towns, the lev‐
els of activity and experience characterising local associ‐
ations and core activists remain low. Even though the PS
provides no material benefits and few exclusive events
to its members, the party’s communities of activists are
characterised by strong collective identities and a high
level of ideological coherence that, according to party
elites, are fuelled mainly by a sense of purpose and
community. However, there are noticeable differences
between the cultures, communities, and organisational
practices of local associations. In terms of power distribu‐
tion, the PS is organisationally a Frankenstein’s monster
combining radically democratic elements of the party
congress and the advisory assembly with a weak and
incoherently elected party council and an extreme level
of centralisation of power in the party executive, whose
representativeness and oversight remains limited.
The PS has many formal characteristics of a mass‐
party, as understood by Albertazzi and van Kessel (2021).
The party should be regarded as one of the European
populist radical right parties that have constructed and
maintained a locally rooted, highly articulated, and
extensive organisation that aims to foster party activists’
commitment and mobilisation (Heinisch & Mazzoleni,
2016). Even though the party arguably values and needs
its activists, both the party’s rules and its informal prac‐
tices severely limit the power of members in the PS—
a characteristic not atypical of mass‐parties, including
other populist radical right parties that adopt this organi‐
sational model (e.g., Jungar, 2016). However, the current
party leadership has avoided using their powers to inter‐
vene in the actions of the sub‐national levels. This sug‐
gests that even a formally centralised party can allow
relative autonomy and agency for its associations and
individual members. If given a generous reading, central‐
isation of power in the current PS could be interpreted
more as a safeguard against radicalisation than actual
lived organisational reality. The PS’s post‐Soini organisa‐
tion is showing clear signs of the shedding of its leader‐
centric legacy (see Arter, 2016) and the development
of a more participatory and inclusive organisational cul‐
ture. Yet the party still clings on to the elite‐driven party
form of his era. This exemplifies how decentralisation
can take place informally within a mass‐party‐type party
organisation even if the top elite is reluctant to share for‐
mal power.
The empirical findings presented in this article sug‐
gest that the PS can be viewed as an (unknowingly) mod‐
ernmass‐party that utilises not only one but several com‐
plementarymodes of organisation. Despite activists play‐
ing a key role in the party’s functioning, the party can
be argued to be (nearly) as reliant on state funding and
the mediatised leadership of its upper party echelons as
are the parties that Katz andMair (1995) would describe
as cartel parties. In addition to benefiting from financial
state support, the PS has also found synergies between
its mass‐membership organisation and less organised
online movements. It has been able to enjoy the ben‐
efits of the stability of having a formal party organisa‐
tion, while being boosted by the agility of online activists
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and sympathisers. This has aided the party, for example,
in fostering a sense of community and purpose among
activists in regions where formal organisational cultures
remain underdeveloped. However, cooperation with
online movements can also pose challenges for a party’s
legitimacy, image, and future direction (Hatakka, 2019).
For example, while the PS’s formal organisational struc‐
ture was being extended to its current width between
2008 and 2013, the party became an organisational
vehicle for overtly radical right demands articulated in
movements that were originally parallel to the formal
party organisation (Pyrhönen, 2015; Ylä‐Anttila, 2020).
When combined with the truly decentralised nature of
the party’s national leadership selection and the low
threshold for activists to advance in the party’s ranks,
this arguably hastened the widespread organisational
entrenchment and mainstreaming of the current radical
right party regime. At present, the party’s official line
pertaining to the Covid‐19 pandemic and vaccinations
is being actively undermined online not only by party
sympathisers but also by party activists. Considering that
social media are rapidly changing the environment in
which party organisations operate, retaining some organ‐
isational safeguards can be necessary for sustaining elec‐
toral and governmental viability.
Therefore, in the current media environment, even
centralised and ideologically coherent mass‐parties such
as the PS might not be entirely successful in socialising
especially locally disengaged or party‐adjacent activists
into sharing a uniform ideology and disseminating it fully
in accordance with the party elites’ and the organisa‐
tion’s interest. If a party’s activist core drifts too far from
the formal organisation and its centralised powers that
allow structured policing and fostering of internal ide‐
ological cohesion (Albertazzi, 2016; Panebianco, 1988),
the party’s legitimacy could be jeopardised by radicali‐
sation and marginalisation. This highlights that parties
similar to the PS must find a balance between reap‐
ing the rewards of providing autonomy for their for‐
mal and informal activists and the challenge of know‐
ing when, where, and how to rein them in. The case of
the PS reveals that despite online activism manifesting
itself seemingly parallel to political parties’ membership,
institutions, events, and campaigns, it remains notice‐
ably and needlessly overlooked in the party organisation
literature—perhaps due to being viewed as external to
the functioning of parties.
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